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The Confucius Institutes have been established by the Chinese government which operates 
them in collaboration with foreign universities and educational institutions in order to 
promote understanding of the Chinese language and culture.  The first Confucius Institute 
opened its doors in Seoul, South Korea in 2004. Within the past seven years, 353 Confucius 
Institutes and 473 Confucius Classrooms have been established in 104 countries and regions. 
It is quite unusual for a language school to be able to make progress so rapidly. These 
developments raise a series of basic questions. First, what are the Confucius Institutes? What 
are their purpose and function? How have they been able to multiply so quickly? Are 
Confucius Institutes instruments of China’s soft power?  This article seeks to answer these 
questions by analyzing the details behind the establishment of Confucius Institutes, their 
organizational mechanism, and their activities. This paper concludes that due to insufficiency 
of cultural content and key concepts which can typify contemporary China, it is hard to see 


















The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2012 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 










The Confucius Institutes have been established by the Chinese government which operates them in 
collaboration with foreign universities and educational institutions in order to promote understanding of 
the Chinese language and culture.  The first Confucius Institute opened its doors in Seoul, South Korea 
in 2004. Within the past seven years, 353 Confucius Institutes and 473 Confucius Classrooms have been 
established in 104 countries and regions. It is quite unusual for a language school to be able to make 
progress so rapidly. These developments raise a series of basic questions. First, what are the Confucius 
Institutes? What are their purpose and function? How have they been able to multiply so quickly? Are 
Confucius Institutes instruments of China’s soft power?  This article seeks to answer these questions by 
analyzing the details behind the establishment of Confucius Institutes, their organizational mechanism, 
and their activities. This paper concludes that due to insufficiency of cultural content and key concepts 
which can typify contemporary China, it is hard to see Confucius Institutes as China’s soft power.  
 






                                                 










 Confucius (Kong Zi, BCE 551–479) is known as the greatest Chinese thinker in history and as 
the founder of the school of thought that bears his name. During his lifetime, Confucius wanted to put his 
thought and philosophy into practice in government, but he was never granted the opportunity to do so. 
He served the state of Lu in the Chunqiu Period, but was not recognized and he later set forth his theory 
of statecraft while traveling from country to country. However, his more than ten years of effort came to 
nothing, and he ultimately devoted himself to teaching and writing. Two and a half millennia later, his 
name is being used by an educational institution—the Confucius Institute—that has spread around the 
globe and won the acceptance of many people. However, the Confucius Institutes have not set up an 
educational program to teach their namesake’s thought; rather, they are institutions that have borrowed his 
name with the goal of spreading the Chinese language around the world. 
 The Confucius Institutes are Chinese language schools. They have been established by the 
Chinese government, which operates them in collaboration with foreign universities and educational 
institutions in order to promote understanding of the Chinese language and culture. In the space of just 
four years—between November 21, 2004, when the first institute opened in Seoul, South Korea and 
October 2008—292 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms opened in 78 countries. That means 
73 new institutes on average opened each year, or one every five days. Such growth has attracted 
attention, as it is quite unusual for a language school to be able to make progress so rapidly. The entity 
responsible for opening Confucius Institutes overseas is the Office of Chinese Language Council 
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International, referred to hereafter by its abbreviation in Chinese, Hanban. Many were dubious when they 
heard the director of Hanban tell the official Xinhua News Agency in 2004 that Hanban wanted to open 
100 institutes in the future. However, people looking at the achievements of this seven-year period have 
been stunned. A flood of requests to open Confucius Institutes has come from across the world, and 
Hanban is more self-assured than when it was starting out. By August 2011, 353 Confucius Institutes and 
473 Confucius Classrooms had been established in 104 countries and regions. 
 Many view the rapid growth of these institutes as an increase in China’s “soft power.” Joseph 
Nye, the Harvard University professor who first proposed the concept of “soft power,” sees the institutes 
as a prime example of such. Furthermore, there are many who warn that the rising numbers of Confucius 
Institutes overseas represent a type of “Chinese cultural coercion.” Some even criticize the Chinese 
culture being taught at Confucius Institutes as ideological propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). There is no end in sight to the ‘for and against’ arguments over the institutes.  These 
developments raise a series of basic questions. First, what are the Confucius Institutes? What are their 
goals? How have they been able to multiply so quickly? These and other questions come to mind, but we 
cannot find the answers to them straight away. Most newspaper articles in Japan to date have focused 
solely on the opening of new institutes and the fact that they are expanding globally. Reports that look 
into the reasons behind this expansion are relatively few. Moreover, there is very little research and 
analysis being done at present in Japan or elsewhere that focuses on the institutes themselves. 
 With that mind, this article seeks to answer the questions raised above by analyzing the 
Confucius Institutes. It will do so by analyzing the details behind their establishment, their organizational 
mechanism, and their activities. The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the position 
of the Confucius Institutes in China itself and their operational mechanism. Section 2 examines the 
activities of the institutes overseas and how people there have viewed them. Section 3 analyzes the 
relationship between the institutes and Chinese soft power. Finally, the conclusion will consider the 
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problem of the products of Chinese culture as part of a discussion into the future prospects for the 
institutes. 
 
1. Founding of the Confucius Institutes and their Operational Mechanism 
 
Positioning the Confucius Institutes 
 Behind the creation of the Confucius Institutes lies the rapid increase in Chinese language 
studies overseas in recent years. More than 2,500 universities around the world offer Chinese language 
classes, and there are already more than 40 million students of the language. Furthermore, several million 
more people take up Chinese language studies every year. The number of people taking the Chinese 
Proficiency Test (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi, HSK) overseas has also rapidly increased year on year. More 
than 130,000 people sat the exam in 2007. There are many reasons as to why such feverish interest in 
studying Chinese has arisen across the world; they include three decades of continuous expansion in the 
Chinese economy, Chinese corporations spreading around the world, new business opportunities being 
created in China, and the country’s expanded presence in international politics. 
 Clearly there is no way to know the kind of debates that have been taking place among China’s 
leaders over the creation of these institutes. In 2004 the Chinese government formulated a five-year plan 
for Chinese language education abroad, commonly known as the Chinese Bridge Project (Hanyu qiao 
gongcheng). Its goal is to bolster the teaching of the Chinese language overseas. The Confucius Institutes 
have been promoted as an important part of this project. Hanban is the organization that controls the 
institutes and comprises representatives from 12 state ministries and commissions. Those entities are the 
General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Development and 
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of 
4 
 
Radio, Film, and Television, the State Press and Publications Administration, the State Council 
Information Office, and the State Language Committee. 
 The question then arises as to what Hanban itself is. According to its website, the organization 
performs the following functions (Hanban website, http://english.hanban.org/, accessed March 1, 2009).  
 
1. To make policies and development plans for promoting Chinese language internationally under the 
direction of Hanban. 
2. To support Chinese language programs at educational institutions of various types and levels in other 
countries. 
3. To direct the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters and establish Confucius Institutes. 
4. To draft international Chinese teaching standards and develop and promote Chinese language teaching 
materials. 
5. To draft international Chinese teacher certification standards and provide training, as well as select 
Chinese teachers and teacher volunteers active overseas and certify their skills for teaching 
Chinese as a foreign language. 
6. To draft guidelines for establishing an international Chinese teaching network, create a platform for 
that network, and provide resources. 
7. To develop and propagate Chinese language examinations of all types. 
 
 From this it can be seen that Hanban has overall control of a field that includes not only the 
Confucius Institutes but also Chinese language education policy, the development of language teaching 
materials, the training and dispatch of language instructors, and Chinese language examinations. The 
Confucius Institutes are one aspect of the business of propagating the Chinese language overseas and one 
of Hanban’s most important operations. The Confucius Institute Administrative Office was created within 
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Hanban’s general affairs department and is responsible for promoting institute initiatives. As the institute 
initiative developed in earnest, Hanban created a Confucius Institute Headquarters in Beijing in April 
2007 in order to improve their organization and administration. The Confucius Institute Headquarters is 
registered as a non-profit organization (NPO) with corporate status. The headquarters organizational chart 
includes an administrative council comprising a chair, a vice-chair, executive council members, and 
council members. The chair, vice-chair, and executive council members are not elected so much as 
selected based on the opinions of the education-related administrative units within the State Council. 
Chen Zili, State Councilor for domestic educational and cultural affairs at the time, served as the first 
chairman. All five vice-chairs were likewise senior civil servants in state ministries and bureaus. They 
included the education minister, the director of the State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the 
deputy secretary general of the State Council, a vice-minister for finance, and a former State Council 
deputy secretary general. The council was chaired at the time of this article’s writing by Liu Yandong, the 
body’s third chairman who, like Chen, was a State Councilor for educational and cultural affairs in China. 
The state covers all of the expenses for the Confucius Institute Headquarters and for its work of 
expanding the institute’s activities overseas. Thus, the Confucius Institute Headquarters is only 
superficially an NPO. It would be no overstatement to describe it in actual fact as a quasi-governmental 
organization that strongly reflects government views. 
 
Organizational Form of the Confucius Institutes 
 Confucius Institutes have been operated by Hanban in conjunction with universities in China and 
local partner institutions abroad. Most of the Chinese universities are state-run institutions under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, while the partner institutions overseas are diverse. The institutes 
can be broadly divided into three categories based on the different natures of the partner institutions. 
 The first type of institute is that operated in conjunction with a foreign university. Most 
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Confucius Institutes are of this type. The overseas university provides a location and facilities, while a 
Chinese university supplies the faculty and classroom materials. The majority of Confucius Institutes in 
Japan belong to this category. The first institute to be opened in Japan, at Kyoto’s Ritsumeikan University, 
is operated by the university in conjunction with Peking University. The institute at Aichi University is 
operated jointly by the host university and China’s Nankai University. 
 The second type comprises institutes operated in conjunction with a public or social organization 
overseas. In this case, the public or social organization secures a location and facilities while a Chinese 
university again provides the faculty and classroom materials. One such example is the Chicago 
Confucius Institute operated jointly by the Chicago Public Schools Office of Language and Cultural 
Education and East China Normal University. The Confucius Institute at the China Institute, created 
jointly by the New York-based China Institute in America and the East China Normal University, is an 
example of a Confucius Institute run in conjunction with a social organization.  
 The third type comprises institutes created and operated in conjunction with foreign corporations 
and target Chinese language students in the world of business. London’s Confucius Institute for Business 
is an example. Funding for this institute has come from several multinational corporations including 
British Petroleum, Deloitte, HSBC, Swire, and Standard Chartered; Tsinghua University and the London 
School of Economics oversee its educational activities and operation. 
 There are other Confucius Institutes whose organizational form does not fall within these three 
patterns. For example, the Open University of China and Michigan State University opened the first 
Cyber Confucius Institute on May 15, 2006. In Japan, the Nagano Prefecture Sino-Japanese Friendship 
Association in partnership with China Radio International launched the Radio Confucius Classroom on 
April 5, 2008. 
 
Instructors, Classroom Materials, and Operational Costs 
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 The language instructors at the institutes are mainly either teachers specializing in Chinese 
language teaching who have been sent from China or are volunteers. To support the further expansion of 
the Confucius Institute initiative, the Ministry of Education designated 17 universities—including Beijing 
Language and Culture University, Peking University, Sun Yat-sen University, and Shandong 
University—as Confucius Institute support institutions. They are charged with choosing instructors and 
volunteers from their home institutions (Lin, 2006: 45). Hanban covers the salaries of the language 
instructors who are dispatched overseas. Slight differences in instructor salaries exist depending on the 
region, but on average it is US$1,500 per month *
 Most of the classroom materials used at the Confucius Institutes were those used for Chinese 
language instruction for foreign exchange students at Chinese universities and in Chinese language 
curricula overseas. For several years Confucius Institutes used different materials depending on where 
they were located. In recent years Hanban has been working at a fever pitch to create uniform materials 
and study programs, a wide variety of materials and programs are available at present. 
 (Beijing qingnian bao, June 1, 2007).  
 In principle, Hanban and the local partner institution cover the operating expenses for the 
institutes on a 1:1 basis, except in the case of the aforementioned business Confucius Institutes, but the 
reality varies from place to place. As often as not, partner institutions in Europe and around the U.S. cover 
expenses that vastly exceed the amounts stipulated in the agreements. All of the expenditures from the 
Chinese side are said to be covered by the government, but just how much money that actually amounts 
to is surrounded in mystery. Based on interviews with government officials in the Chinese media, it 
appears that Hanban spends US$100,000 per school annually (China Culture Daily, 
http://www.ccdy.cn/pubnews/545848/20090205/567007.htm, accessed March 2, 2009). A simple 
calculation shows the expenditure for 300 schools to total US$30 million, or around 200 million yuan. 
                                                 
*  The monthly salary of US$1,500 is quite low compared to the remuneration received by a visiting 
researcher going overseas (roughly US$3,000 to US$5,000), so university instructors are somewhat less 
than enthusiastic about being sent overseas to teach at Confucius Institutes. 
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The amount of money to operate a single institute certainly is not all that much, even if the partner 
institution overseas is supplying the same amount of money to cover operating expenses.  
 
Reactions from the Government and Universities 
 Chinese universities certainly cannot ignore the Confucius Institutes given that they are a 
state-run project, and many universities are in fact extremely proactive about opening institutes. To take 
China’s most prestigious university as an example, since April 2006 Peking University has created 
Confucius Institutes with ten foreign universities with which it has close ties and formal agreements: 
Ritsumeikan and Waseda universities in Japan, Stanford University in the US, Free University Berlin in 
Germany, Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, Jawaharlal Nehru University in India, the University of 
Granada in Spain, Moscow University in Russia, Cairo University in Egypt, and the Specialist Schools 
and Academies Trust in the U.K. The first Chinese university to recruit foreign exchange students and 
provide them with language training was Beijing Language and Culture University, doing so in the 
greatest numbers of any Chinese university. By 2009, It had highlighted its strengths as a university 
specializing in languages by establishing Confucius Institutes at 12 universities in 10 countries. Not only 
the major universities but also their more local counterparts are making these sorts of moves. 
 The Chinese government has attached great importance to the Confucius Institute undertaking, 
sending Beijing’s local ambassador or consul to attend opening ceremonies for new institutes overseas. 
One often witnesses the spectacle of ministerial or vice-ministerial level officials coming from China to 
attend openings at prestigious universities regarded as strategically important. Depending on the situation, 
even a senior official at the level of executive vice-premier of the State Council might attend. Chinese 
President Hu Jintao attended the ceremony held on June 15, 2004 to mark the opening of the Tashkent 
University Confucius Institute in Uzbekistan. Premier Wen Jiabao, meanwhile, joined Portugal’s prime 
minister to attend the signing ceremony for the Lisbon University Confucius Institute on January 31, 2007. 
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Based on the above, we can see how much emphasis the Chinese government places on the operations of 
the Confucius Institute. 
 
Problems Arising in Establishing Confucius Institutes 
 Of course, the Confucius Institute initiative has not been simply a, one-dimensional success story. 
There are many critics of the institutes in China. For example, Hanban engages in commercial activities 
focused on the Chinese language education market overseas, including the Confucius Institutes. As a 
result, some suspect that it is generating enormous profits. Hanban is not the only entity to face such 
criticism; it applies to many of the individual business units that exist within China’s current political and 
economic structures. Criticisms of this sort are unavoidable to the extent that its accounts are settled in an 
especially transparent fashion given that it is a business unit that receives all of its economic support from 
the government. Furthermore, since the problem of educational inequality within the country has not been 
completely resolved, there will also be those who are critical of spending large amounts of money on 
language businesses overseas (Zhe Ren, 2010). 
 The most serious problem is that of human resources. It is thought that some 100,000 people will 
be needed every year to work as Chinese language teachers overseas. However, the number of people 
who can be trained each year to teach the language to non-Chinese remains at about 5,000; the demand 
thus far greatly exceeds the supply. Only 33 universities in China have teaching Chinese as a foreign 
language in their curricula. Those programs produce only 1,500 graduates every year. Another 3,000 or so 
people acquire certification to teach Chinese as a foreign language during their time away from university. 
Combining these two figures gives around 5,000 people. In efforts to resolve this dilemma, in March 
2004 the Ministry of Education launched its Volunteer Program for International Chinese Teachers. The 
original goal of this program was to provide volunteers with a certain amount of training and send them 
overseas to teach Chinese for 6 to 24 months at a time. However, the program has not developed 
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satisfactorily owing to cost constraints (Jingji Cankao Bao [Economic Information Daily], April 30, 
2004). Moreover, in many cases volunteers have been sent abroad after receiving only brief amounts of 
training because the supply cannot keep up with the demand. 
 
2. Overseas Activities of the Confucius Institute 
 Thus far this study has examined the circumstances behind the founding of the Confucius 
Institute in China, its organizational mechanisms, and the problems it faces. Next, let us consider the 
reception that the Confucius Institutes have met with overseas. This section will explore the actual 
activities of the institutes overseas and how the institutes are seen. 
 Confucius Institutes are being opened mainly around Asia, Europe, and North America. 
Sixty-five have been opened in the latter region, with those established at U.S. universities accounting for 
the lion’s share (55). In 22 countries in Europe, 55 institutes have been opened, with comparatively large 
numbers in Russia (9), Great Britain (8), Germany (8), and France (7). In Asia, there are 63 schools in 22 
countries, led by Japan (13, or 16 if Confucius Classrooms are included—see Table 1 for details), 
Thailand (13), and South Korea (12) (Hanban website, 
http://www.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy_list.php?ithd=gzky, accessed February 2, 2009). All of these countries 
are also of great importance to China’s diplomatic activities. The fact that 55 have been opened in the U.S. 
might seem surprising, but it makes sense if we consider how big a presence the U.S. is in Chinese 
foreign affairs. Russia and the three European Union (EU) countries follow it in the importance with 
which they are regarded. The large number of institutes created in Asia can be understood as reflecting 
not only the great importance that China places on relations with its neighbors, but also the strong interest 
that those countries have in China in return.  
 Here, I would like to touch on the example of Japan to get a feel for the realities of the Confucius 
Institutes overseas. In Japan, universities that have invested energy into education and research about Asia, 
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in particular, have been quite active when it comes to establishing Confucius Institutes. The first institute 
in Japan was established jointly by Ritsumeikan University and Peking University and opened its doors 
on June 28, 2005. The number of institutes steadily increased thereafter; 13 (16 including Confucius 
Classrooms) were founded by 2008 (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1  List of Confucius Institutes in Japan 
 Date Opened Japanese Institution Location Chinese Institution 
1 June 28, 2005 Ritsumeikan University, 
Confucius Institute 
Ritsumeikan University, 













3 December 15, 2005 Hokuriku University, 
Confucius Institute 
Ishikawa  Beijing Language and 
Culture University 
4 February 24, 2006 Aichi University, Confucius 
Institute 
Aichi  Nankai University 
5 August 3, 2006 Sapporo University, 
Confucius Institute 
Hokkaidō Guandong University 
of Foreign Studies 
6 October 25, 2006 Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific 
University, Confucius 
Institute 
Oita  Zhejiang University 
7 April 12, 2007 Waseda University, 
Confucius Institute 
Tokyo  Peking University 
8 August 28, 2007 Osaka Sangyo University, 
Confucius Institute 
Osaka  Shanghai International 
Studies University 







10 November 16, 2007 Fukuyama University, 
Confucius Institute 
Fukuyama University, 
Confucius Institute Ginga 
Confucius Classroom 
Hiroshima  (Beijing) University of 
International Business 
and Economics and 
Shanghai Normal 
University 
11 November 25, 2007 Okayama Shoka University, 
Confucius Institute 
Okayama  Dalian University of 
Foreign Languages 
12 December , 2007 Kobe Tōyō Iryō Gakuin, 
Confucius Classroom 
Hyōgo  Tianjin University of 
Traditional Chinese 
Medicine 
13 January 22, 2008 Kōgakuin University, 
Confucius Institute 
Tokyo  Beihang University 
Sources: Compiled by the author from Nikkei torendinetto, 
<http://trendy.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/pickup/20080425/1009943/>, accessed March 1, 2009; and Hanban 
website, <http://www.hanban.org/index.php>. 
 
Confucius Institute Activities 
 Turn next to the actual activities in which the Confucius Institutes engage, according to 
paragraph 11 of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, the services provided by the 
institutes overseas include the following items: (1) provide Chinese language training for people from all 
walks of life; (2) train Chinese language instructors and provide Chinese language teaching resources; (3) 
hold the Chinese proficiency test (HSK) and tests for the certification of Chinese language teachers; (4) 
provide information and consultative services concerning Chinese language education and China’s culture, 
economy, and society; and (5) conduct research on contemporary China. Chinese language education 
receives particularly strong emphasis. Opened with non-profit objectives, the Confucius Institutes are 
13 
 
quite appealing when compared to for-profit language schools for adults. In Japan, they are also seen as 
being more trustworthy than the average language school thanks to the brand power of the name 
“Confucius” and the support structure that the universities provide.  
 Let us look at the example of the Obirin University Confucius Institute to better understand the 
reality of these schools in Japan. This institute offers a variety of open lectures on Chinese language at all 
levels from beginner to advanced. Courses are available that focus on conversation, interpretation and 
translation, and HSK preparation to cater for students with such respective objectives in mind. Aside from 
language, the institute also offers classes on such topics as Chinese tea, calligraphy, and film, through 
which students can get a taste of Chinese culture. The courses are broken up into a spring term from April 
to August with 15 sessions per course, and a fall term from September to the following February with 20 
sessions per course. Students can choose their preferred time as well, with lectures given on weekdays in 
the morning, afternoon, and evening (Nikkei torendinetto 
http://trendy.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/pickup/20080425/1009943/, accessed March 1, 2009). The cost, 
always a crucial issue, is 35,000 yen for fifteen 90-minute classes. In contrast, the night-school course at 
Nitchū Gakuin, a school with a long history in the field of Chinese language education, costs 46,000 yen 
per course (ten 120-minute classes), including enrollment and tuition fees and expenses. Comparing the 
two, we can see then that the Obirin University Confucius Institute is relatively cheap. 
 Language education and cultural activities form the core of the operations that the Confucius 
Institutes engage in overseas, but some institutes are involved in unique activities aside from those. Let’s 
take an example of an institute that opened in Thailand. In August 2006, in conjunction with Southwest 
University of Chongqing, China, Thailand’s Khon Kaen University opened a Confucius Institute in the 
city of the same name. Thailand’s sericulture industry is also being developed in the Khon Kaen region. 
The Chinese partner institution, Southwest University, has taken advantage of its strengths in silkworm 
research by sending, along with language teachers, specialists in that field who provide mentoring to the 
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local sericulture industry. On top of this, we also see that the Chinese have been making efforts to break 
into the Thai automobile and motorcycle markets owing to their size. The Chinese held a Chongqing 
industrial exhibition in the region and invited Chonqing’s automobile and motorcycle manufacturers to 
display their latest products there (Zong, 2007: 97). 
 Naturally, there is no guarantee that all of the Confucius Institutes are as active as the ones 
mentioned above. The Waseda University Confucius Institute, the first of the institutes to focus on 
research, made a splashy debut in Japan in 2007. A powerhouse lineup attended the ceremony for inking 
the pact, including former Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō (Waseda alumnus), Upper House parliamentarian 
Yoshimura Gōtarō (Waseda alumnus), and Lower House parliamentarian Obuchi Yūko (Waseda alumna) 
from Japan and then-Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and then-Ambassador Wang Yi from China. However, 
although the institute had the goal of “working together to train young scholars and engaging in joint 
Sino-Japanese research projects,” it has been extremely quiet and is not well-known off campus. 
 
Assessments and Criticisms of Confucius Institutes Overseas 
 It is safe to say that there is a China boom and interest in learning Chinese in many places 
around the world based on the rapid expansion of the Confucius Institutes over such a short period. 
However, this is not the only reason for their rapid spread overseas. The most important reason is the 
issue of financing. Previously, when an overseas institution wanted to set up a Chinese language 
educational curriculum, they could expect very little financial support from the Chinese government. Now, 
however, the burden on overseas partner institutions has been reduced. When they open a Confucius 
Institute, they can receive a certain amount of financial support from Hanban, which is a stand-in for the 
Chinese government. Most of the written agreements state that Hanban and the partner institution will 
jointly provide financing at a 1:1 ratio. While the actual ratio differs greatly depending on the location, 
getting Hanban to provide some US$100,000 per institute per year in financing is indispensable to their 
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stable operation. This financing probably makes it relatively easy to attract partner institutions. 
 Launching a Confucius Institute frequently gets better publicity when establishing close ties with 
the local community. For example, the Cyber Confucius Institute that Michigan State and the Open 
University opened received great publicity by appointing members of the state Board of Education as 
advisers in an attempt to increase its influence and name recognition at the local level. Moreover, by 
using local newspapers, news organizations, and television to aggressively publicize the facility, it 
attracted the attention of the local community (Yi, 2007: 78). The Confucius Institutes are being noticed 
for promoting an understanding and appreciation of China overseas through the medium of 
less-politicized fields like language and culture. For example, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on a 
visit to the Chicago Confucius Institute on February 8, 2008 made a point of speaking about the 
contribution the institute was making in promoting Chinese culture. On his visit to China, British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown in talks with institute administrators lauded the institutes for the great 
contribution they were making to cultural exchanges between the two countries. 
 Of course, the effort to expand the Confucius Institutes also faces many problems. The biggest 
issue the institutes face overseas is that of wariness and concern. Many see them as constituting a Chinese 
cultural invasion and as being permeated with ideology, and moves are being made to resist them. In 
Japan, for example, there are well-rooted efforts to warn people about the expansion of the institutes in 
both the public and private sectors. None of the efforts to bring Confucius Institutes to state-run 
universities in the country have been successful. 
 Given that the institutes are still relatively new, many issues likely lie below the surface. There 
are aspects to them that are not yet apparent, and they will need to be examined over a longer period to 
make an objective assessment. However, it may well be that because the Confucius Institutes are a 
state-run project, they are going to face many problems in terms of raising funds, their actual operation, 
their systems for determining responsibility, and so forth as a result of their rapid spread. A more detailed 
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investigation of this dimension will be needed in the future. 
 
3. The Confucius Institutes and Chinese Soft Power 
 Two episodes of note involving language occurred at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
summit meeting held in Australia during September 2007. In one, then-U.S. President George W. Bush 
misspoke during a speech, referring to host country “Australia” as “Austria,” a mistake for which people 
called him a fool. Bush, who was visiting Australia when public opinion critical of the Iraq War was at its 
height, quickly boarded his plane for the flight home leaving the criticism and laughter behind. The 
second occurred during a lunch meeting chaired by then-Australian Prime Minister John Howard when 
the then-leader of Australia’s main opposition party, Kevin Rudd, offered a greeting to Chinese President 
Hu Jintao. Speaking in fluent Chinese, Rudd issued a volley of remarks, referring to Hu as Australia’s 
most-respected guest and inviting him to take time off and do some sightseeing around town. In so doing, 
he upstaged Howard and took his place as the shining star of the event. On top of that, the following day 
Rudd created a big sensation by conversing with Hu again in fluent Chinese at a meeting between the pair 
that lasted for 30 minutes. Rudd’s name as rendered in Chinese, Lu Ke-wen, became widely known 
throughout China as a result. The Rudd-led Labour Party scored a victory in the Australian general 
election that took place in November 2007. As a consequence, “Lu Ke-wen” experienced a boom in his 
popularity in China as the first Western leader to speak fluent Mandarin. 
 Language is not the only issue involved in these two episodes. These episodes provide good 
materials that enable us to observe the changes in American and Chinese soft power. America’s decision 
to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the “war on terror,” and the war in Iraq are all connected to the spread of 
anti-U.S. sentiment around the world, dealing a blow to U.S. soft power. Meanwhile, with its economy 
continuing to grow rapidly, China has been earning high marks around the world as “a good and 
free-spending buyer” and as offering “the best market.” Soft power has been defined as the capacity to 
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influence the behavior of others to accomplish the outcomes that that one wants (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004). 
American soft power is based on American culture, including everything from Hollywood movies and 
such popular music genres as rock and jazz to things like Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, sneakers and T-shirts, 
to even literature like hard-boiled detective stories and mysteries, classical music, the fine and plastic arts, 
and even the urban culture of cities like New York and Los Angeles (Aoki, 2003: 137). The concept as 
applied to China, however, takes on an even broader range of meanings.  
 Even though more than 30 years have passed since the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
reforms of 1978 began, Western criticism of China regarding its political system, human rights issues, its 
treatment of Tibet, and so forth continues unabated today. This has been an important element in forming 
China’s image overseas; there are many factors to account for on the negative side when we speak of 
Chinese soft power. However, the culture of the country—with its 5,000 years of history and one of the 
four great ancient civilizations—also retains an appeal that continues unabated today. There is also the 
fact that increasing numbers of notable Chinese are active at a global level in sports, film, and music, 
including such individuals as film director Zhang Yimou, movie star Zhang Ziyi, 100-meter hurdler Liu 
Xiang, basketball player Yao Ming, and pianist Lang Lang. Outside of the worlds of traditional and 
popular culture, too, China has been steadily expanding its influence through its economic activities 
abroad and participation in multilateral, international organizations. Furthermore, many countries have 
responded favorably to the Chinese foreign policy approach with its emphasis on practical gains without 
creating enemies. The China boom overseas are among the factors at work when it comes to doing 
business with China, and the Confucius Institutes are truly satisfying the resulting demand. 
 Harvard’s Joseph Nye has noted the marked increase in Chinese soft power in recent years. 
Drawing attention to that rise, Nye indirectly implies that concentrating its efforts in that area would be a 
clever approach for China to take. Nye cites Beijing’s creation of Confucius Institutes around the world to 
teach China’s language and culture as one example of this soft power (Wall Street Journal Asia, 
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December 29, 2005). 
 
The Age of Cultural Competition 
 The name of the Confucius Institutes has its origins in Germany’s official cultural institution, the 
Goethe Institut. The Goethe Institut was founded in 1951 to provide a variety of services related to 
German society, arts, and language. It has established more than 140 facilities in 78 countries around the 
world, and the network formed by the institutes, German cultural centers, and language testing 
organizations plays an important role in Germany’s external cultural exchange activities. Germany’s 
Goethe Insitut is not the only official cultural institution engaged in international cultural exchange 
activities. The Alliance Francaise, the British Council, Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, and Japan culture 
centers operating under the umbrella of the Japan Foundation are among the entities to have won 
approbation abroad through their long years of involvement in cultural exchange activities.  
 The Confucius Institute has modeled its activities mainly on those of the Goethe Institut and the 
Instituto Cervantes. It has followed in their footsteps by doing work mainly related to language education 
and cultural exchange. The Goethe Institut also serves as a model for the Confucius Institute in the sense 
that even though it was established through the efforts of the government, the stress on the independence 
of its activities makes it appealing for its lack of political import. In terms of operations, on the other hand, 
China’s approach differs from those of Germany and Spain. In the latter cases, operational headquarters in 
the home country takes the lead in creating branches overseas (primarily in capital or major cities). 
Beijing, however, has taken advantage of the inter-university network to expand its institutes rapidly. This 
is because even though the first Confucius Institute was established in Seoul in November 2004, it was 
not until April 2007 that the Confucius Institute Headquarters opened its doors. 
 The spread of the institutes under the aegis of the Chinese government has stirred up its 
neighbors considerably. There has been surprise in Japan, Korea, and India at the vigor of the Confucius 
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Institutes, and each has felt the need to step up its own international cultural initiatives. We should keep 
an eye on how their continued efforts to match up against “Confucius” play out, with their use of the 
names of noted individuals from their respective pasts such as Murasaki Shikibu, Sejong the Great, and 
Mohandas Gandhi to publicize their respective languages and cultures to the world. 
 Taiwan is perhaps the most concerned about the Confucius Institutes. Bear in mind that China 
has been openly accepting of foreigners coming to the country only since the mid-1990s. Prior to that, it 
was Taiwan and Hong Kong that promoted Chinese language training and Chinese culture. Taiwan in 
particular invited foreigners in large numbers to its universities and devoted its energies to cultural 
activities including language study. This played an important part in bolstering Taiwanese soft power in 
international society. However, Taiwanese soft power has declined relatively speaking on account of the 
economic development and open-door policies adopted on the Chinese mainland. For a long time, Taipei 
was the place that overseas Chinese around the world chose for Chinese language studies, but now they 
choose instead places on the mainland like Shanghai and Beijing. Unlike the members of their parents’ 
generation who acquired their education in Taiwan, the younger generation of overseas Chinese study at 
Peking University or Fudan University in Shanghai. As a result, these children know almost nothing 
about Taiwan (Joshua Kurlantzick, 2007: 71). 
 
Conclusion 
 Many people if asked to give an example of something that represents American popular culture 
would be likely to say without hesitation “Hollywood.” Similarly, they would likely to be say “manga” or 
“anime” if asked about Japanese popular culture and “serial dramas” in the case of Korea. However, 
nothing is likely to come to mind right away if they are asked to provide one for Chinese popular culture. 
One might come up with “movies” for Hong Kong or “television dramas” for Taiwan, but what sort of 
original items of popular culture would someone associate with the Chinese mainland? It certainly is hard 
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to find something distinctively Chinese about the Chinese youth of today, who eat fast food, imitate 
Japanese clothing fashions, and enjoy Hollywood movies. This issue also confounds many scholars who 
debate about Chinese soft power. 
 Behind this confusion is the fact that the Chinese culture industry lags considerably behind. The 
industry is far behind those of the U.S. or European countries, and it also trails compared to those of its 
neighbors Japan and Korea. To give one example, a string of Chinese movies have won awards at 
international film festivals in recent years, but they have an extremely limited presence in foreign markets 
and are a long way from being something people would regard as synonymous with Chinese pop culture. 
Chinese scholar Yu Xin-Tian observes, “China’s modernization is still in its early stages, and it is not 
sufficiently coherent to respond to the myriad other cultures and values in the world (Yu and others, 2007: 
319). At a moment when it is not possible to claim in clear and simple language that something in 
particular stands out in Chinese culture, China would seem to have no choice but to put that aside and 
instead stress its history and culture in its quest to find words or concepts synonymous with its culture. 
Finding such a synonym may become more important than increasing the number of institutes as the 
Confucius Institute undertaking continues to develop.  
 In October 2005, Time magazine (Asian edition) put on one of its covers Chris Li (Li Yuchun), 
the winner of an event for singers called the “Super Girl” contest. Some 400 million people watched the 
event with excitement and cast their votes by mobile phone, the results delivering a victory to the 
tomboyish Li. A popular program adapted for China from “American Idol,” “Super Girl” represents a new 
element in Chinese popular culture. The opening ceremonies for the 2008 Beijing Olympics—which 
offered up an exquisite pairing of the traditional and the contemporary—certainly were something that 
China wanted the world to see and they charmed many. New Chinese cultural products are being 
generated steadily. Expanding the Confucius Institutes stands as both an action for propagating Chinese 
culture and also a process for rediscovering it. 
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 Of course, there are limits to just how much China’s positive image overseas can be boosted by 
developing a culture industry. Soft power can certainly makes its influence felt so long as it operates in 
conjunction with how affairs are handled in China itself. Is the world of Chinese politics open? Does 
Chinese society respect human rights? Does the country provide education and social welfare of a high 
quality? Is it a society in which foreigners can settle and live happily? Although China has managed 30 
years’ worth of huge economic growth, it still faces many problems when it comes to creating political 
and social systems and has countless other problems in various areas that need to be dealt with promptly. 
As such, a long road still lies ahead for China in its quest not only to be a country in demand 
economically for its manufacturing capacity, but also to become a truly appealing great power that 
disseminates its culture to the world. 
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